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Economic Growth and Development:
Perspectives for Policymakers
A Summary of the 2006 Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum
conomic Growth and Development: 
Perspectives for Policymakers” was the topic 
of our sixth annual Philadelphia Fed Policy 
Forum held on December 1, 2006.  This 
event, sponsored by the Bank’s Research Department, 
brought together economic scholars, policymakers, and 
market economists to discuss and debate the drivers of 
economic development worldwide and the effectiveness of 
policies to improve growth and reduce poverty.  Our hope 
is that the 2006 Policy Forum will serve as a catalyst for 
both greater understanding of and further research on the 
important topic of international economic development.
1Many of the presentations reviewed here 
and background papers are available on our 
website at www.philadelphiafed.org/econ/conf/ 
forum2006/program.html.
2The World Bank, Economic Growth in the 
1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform (The 
World Bank, April 2005).
Most economists agree that 
economic growth is the driver of a 
country’s standard of living.  But 
what drives economic growth?  What 
programs and policies are effective at 
promoting economic development and 
the reduction of poverty and how is 
effectiveness best determined?  Have 
there been unforeseen consequences of 
policies that we need to bear in mind 
when designing new programs?  These 
were some of the questions addressed 
in the 2006 Policy Forum.
Charles Plosser, president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
provided opening remarks.  He pointed 
out that while the developed world 
has spent trillions of dollars promot-
ing development around the world, 
the track record has not been entirely 
positive.  In his view, it is important 
that we recognize and learn from past 
mistakes, and this means taking a step 
back to look at the long-run economic 
impacts of different types of programs. 
It also means tackling challenging and 
sometimes controversial issues like cor-
ruption, foreign aid, and trade.  These 
were among the topics addressed the 
rest of the day.
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND 
DEVELOPMENT: AN OVERVIEW 
OF ISSUES AND EVIDENCE1
Roberto Zagha, of the World 
Bank, began the first session with an 
overview of a World Bank study on de-
velopment lessons from the 1990s and 
their implications.2 In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, the World Bank had 
a sense that to spur economic growth, 
all governments need do is implement 
the so-called Washington consensus of 
financial and trade liberalization, mac-
roeconomic stability, and privatization. 
However, as the 1990s unfolded, the 
effectiveness of these policies began to 
be questioned as countries thought to 
have improved their policies still suf-
fered from low growth rates.  Indeed, 
although policies improved in the 
1980s and 1990s, growth performance 
was lower than in the 1960s and 1970s.   
There appeared to be no set formula 
for success.  China and India, which 
remained relatively closed economies 
with large public sectors, grew much 
faster than countries like Brazil, Ar-
gentina, and Chile, which had liberal-
ized much faster. The length and depth 
of the recession in Russia and other 
countries of the former Soviet Union 
surprised many, given the improve-
ment in the economic policy regime. 
Several countries, including those in 
East Asia, Brazil, and Argentina, ex-
perienced financial crises. It appeared 
that improvements in policy did not 
necessarily lead to improvements in 
economic performance, leading the 
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processes are much more complex than 
it had earlier thought. In addition, 
since the models underlying certain 
economic systems are unknown, the 
response functions to certain policy 
actions were not necessarily what one 
expected.  The World Bank concluded 
that there typically needs to be a lot 
of learning by doing and experimenta-
tion until effective policies are imple-
mented.   
The World Bank’s systematic 
study of the 1990s combined 
information from empirical analyses 
and from practitioners in the field.  
The study suggests that institutions 
and history matter and that no two 
successful outcomes are necessarily 
alike.  Among the study’s many lessons 
is that how macroeconomic stability 
is achieved is as important as stability 
itself.  As Zagha pointed out, when 
fiscal deficits are reduced by curtailing 
investment in infrastructure, there 
is a clear tradeoff between stability 
achieved in the short run and long-
term economic growth.  Another 
lesson is that trade reforms are not 
a panacea. They typically require 
complementary reforms, e.g., exchange 
rate policies and trade logistics, to be 
effective, and the gains from trade 
reforms are not necessarily shared 
with the poor – income inequality 
remains an issue.  This lesson was also 
emphasized later in the day by speakers 
Dani Rodrik and Ann Harrison.  A 
third lesson is that policies should not 
merely focus on achieving the efficient 
use of resources (a static concept) 
but also on expanding productive 
capacity (a dynamic concept).  Based 
on the study’s revelation of the 
complexity of the issues surrounding 
effective growth policies, the World 
Bank in partnership with other 
international agencies and private 
foundations has established an 
independent commission on growth 
and development, chaired by Nobel 
laureate Michael Spence.  Zagha 
explained that the commission brings 
together top academic researchers and 
practitioners, so that the best empirical 
and analytical thinking on economic 
growth and development can be 
coupled with experience in the field to 
inform policymaking. 
Xavier Sala-i-Martin, of Colum-
bia University, continued the discus-
sion, focusing on the consequences of 
economic growth for the distribution 
of income, in particular, the level of 
poverty, i.e., the percentage of people 
below a certain income threshold, and 
the degree of income inequality, i.e., 
dispersion in income levels. Sala-i-
Martin pointed out that the national 
income data for countries indicate that 
growth of per capita income world-
wide has been increasing for the last 
two centuries and accelerating since 
1970, while it has also diverged across 
countries.  The economies of poor 
countries have tended to grow slower 
than those of rich countries, so-called 
E-divergence.  In addition, measures of 
cross-country income dispersion, e.g., 
the variance of log income, have been 
rising, so-called V-divergence. But 
these results are based on country-level 
income data and not on the income 
levels of individuals – they essentially 
treat every country as a single obser-
vation and thus give a low weight to 
individuals in high-population coun-
tries like China, compared to those in 
low-population countries like Lesotho.  
The country-level distribution has lit-
tle to say about the welfare of individu-
als.  Weighting country-level per capita 
income by population goes part of the 
way toward uncovering the worldwide 
income distribution of individuals but 
not all the way, since it still assumes 
that everyone within a country earns 
the same level of income. Unfortu-
nately, individual-level income data are 
not available in the national income 
accounts of countries. Sala-i-Martin 
explained his method of constructing 
the distribution of income across indi-
viduals for each country.  He sets the 
mean of the distribution for each coun-
try at its per capita income level as 
calculated from the country’s national 
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income accounts data and then he 
derives a measure of dispersion around 
this mean based on survey data on 
individuals collected from a variety of 
sources.  These calculations involve a 
number of approximations. From there, 
individual-level income distributions 
can be calculated based on parametric 
or nonparametric methods, which yield 
similar results.3
In China, income inequality 
across individuals has increased greatly 
over the past three decades: The rich 
are getting richer at a much faster pace 
than the incomes of the poor are ris-
ing. But the number of people below 
the poverty line – which the World 
Bank defines at about $1 per day – has 
also declined very quickly. In other 
countries, while economic growth 
has shifted the income distribution to 
the right, it is less clear how income 
dispersion has changed over time. In
India, the level of dispersion hasn’t 
changed; in the U.S., income inequal-
ity has risen. Many countries in Africa, 
including Nigeria, the most populated 
country in Africa, have experienced 
negative growth, so their income dis-
tributions have shifted to the left and 
there has been an explosion in poverty 
levels.  At the same time, the right-
hand side of the distribution is moving 
to the right – higher income individu-
als are getting richer. Sala-i-Martin 
suggests that these people, who tend to 
have the political power, may have less 
incentive to implement any reforms.  
When the income distributions 
across individuals for each country 
are aggregated into a distribution for 
the world, one finds that conclusions 
about changes in the level of poverty 
and income inequality are quite differ-
ent from the ones based on the world 
distribution of per capita income across 
countries.  Sala-i-Martin finds that be-
tween 1970 and 2000, the percentage 
of people living in poverty has fallen 
(from about 15 percent to 6 percent, 
using the $1 per day definition of the 
poverty level).  And the number, rather 
than the percentage, of people in the 
world living in poverty has declined 
since 1978. This decline in poverty has 
been seen in each region of the world 
except Africa. In 1970, three-quarters 
of the world’s poor were in Asia; today, 
the majority of the poor are in Africa.   
The distribution of income across 
individuals in the world indicates that 
inequality across individuals has actu-
ally fallen since the 1970s.  This has 
occurred even though within coun-
tries, income inequality across individ-
uals has risen and per capita income 
across countries has diverged. This 
seeming contradiction is reconciled by 
recognizing that global inequality is 
the sum of within-country inequality 
and cross-country inequality, which is 
not the inequality 
in per capita income 
across countries 
but the inequality 
across individuals 
that would exist 
in the world if all 
citizens within each 
country had the 
same level of in-
come but there were 
different per capita 
levels of income 
across countries. 
This cross-country 
inequality has fallen 
(and more than 
enough to offset 
the rise in within-
country inequality) 
because the incomes 
of poor people in 
Asia have risen at 
a faster rate than the incomes of rich 
people in the OECD countries, and 
these poor constitute a large popula-
tion. Once the incomes of these poor 
people catch up, Sala-i-Martin expects 
inequality to resume increasing, un-
less economic growth in Africa picks 
up and raises the income of the poor 
in those countries. Indeed, his results 
show that cross-country inequality 
explains more of the inequality across 
individuals than within-country in-
equality, suggesting that aggregate eco-
nomic growth in poor countries would 
be not only the way to reduce poverty 
but also the way to reduce inequality 
across individuals.
POLICY RESPONSES: TRADE 
AND FOREIGN CREDIT
Our second session turned to 
two policy initiatives: trade and for-
eign credit.  Elhanan Helpman, of 
Harvard University, outlined some of 
the advances that have been made 
in understanding how production is 
organized across countries, including 
3See Xavier Sala-i-Martin, “The World 
Distribution of Income: Falling Poverty and 
…Convergence, Period,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (May 2006), pp. 351-97.
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recent research on international trade 
and foreign direct investment.4 Global-
ization has led to new patterns of world 
specialization. Traditional explanations 
of international trade emphasized dif-
ferences across countries in technology 
and factor endowments. In the 1980s, 
economists enhanced their explana-
tions based on scale economies in pro-
duction and monopolistic competition, 
which helped explain why a lot of trade 
takes place among countries that are 
more similar than different, something 
that could not be explained by earlier 
theories. In the last few years, elements 
of within-industry heterogeneity, the 
global sourcing strategies of firms, and 
the importance of institutions have 
been incorporated into the theory. 
Traditionally, foreign direct investment 
has been classified into two types: 
horizontal and vertical. Horizontal for-
eign direct investment involves firms’ 
building a plant in a foreign country to 
produce products to sell in that mar-
ket. Vertical foreign direct investment 
involves firms’ investing in low-cost 
countries to produce intermediate 
inputs that are not necessarily used in 
products sold to the host country. But 
the integration strategies of multina-
tional corporations have become more 
complex, requiring a more complex 
theory to explain the observed global 
sourcing strategies of firms.
As Helpman explained, the in-
ternational organization of production 
can be described along two dimen-
sions.  The industry can vertically in-
tegrate all of its production in a single 
entity or it can outsource some of its 
production.  It can locate its produc-
tion activities (and its outsourced ac-
tivities) at home or abroad.  Industries 
4For further discussion, see Elhanan Helpman, 
“Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms,” 
Journal of Economic Literature, 44 (September 
2006), pp. 589-630.
5William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: 
Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done 
So Much Ill and So Little Good (Penguin Group 
[USA], March 2006). 
High-productivity firms tend to be the 
exporters because they are the firms that
can cover the fixed costs of operating in 
foreign markets.
that choose to be vertically integrated 
in a foreign country are essentially 
engaging in foreign direct investment. 
Thus, there will be inter-industry dif-
ferences in foreign direct investment 
levels.  The theory also suggests that 
there will be intra-industry differences. 
High-productivity firms tend to be the 
exporters because they are the firms 
that can cover the fixed costs of oper-
ating in foreign markets.
This analysis suggests that trade 
liberalization will have important ef-
fects not only across industries but 
within industries. In particular, open-
ing trade pushes the low-productivity 
firms out of the industry and reallo-
cates production to the high-produc-
tivity firms.  As a result, it raises the 
average productivity of the industries 
involved.  The theory suggests that 
trade liberalization will also affect do-
mestic firms’ rate of technology adop-
tion and that the choice of whether to 
export or to engage in foreign direct 
investment depends not only on the 
average productivity in the industry 
but also on how productivity is distrib-
uted across firms.  As Helpman ex-
plained, this means one cannot think 
about different sources of comparative 
advantage independently from one an-
other.  For example, comparative ad-
vantage that comes from endowments 
will induce different productivity levels 
in different industries, which is an-
other source of comparative advantage.   
Financial institutions, the quality of 
the legal system in enforcing contracts, 
and labor market institutions (such 
as hiring and firing costs) are other 
sources of comparative advantage.  
Studies have shown that each of these 
has a distinct and important impact 
on the structure of trade, comparable 
in size to other determinants of trade 
flows, such as tariffs.  Helpman con-
cludes that the advances in the theory 
of trade suggest that it can no longer 
be viewed as merely a sectoral adjust-
ment; rather, it has important implica-
tions for the patterns of productivity 
within and across industries and, 
therefore, for economic growth.
William Easterly, of New York 
University, drew on his recently pub-
lished book to discuss the impact of 
foreign aid on world poverty.5 Al-
though many policymakers and insti-
tutions over many years have called 
for a “big push” of foreign aid to rid 
the world poverty, Easterly is highly 
skeptical of this planners’ approach. 
First, there is no evidence that poor 
countries are in a so-called poverty 
trap. The poorest countries are no 
more likely than others to have zero 
per capita growth or to have growth 
levels that would make them fall fur-
ther behind the richest countries in 
terms of income. Moreover, there is no 
evidence that foreign aid raises growth 
to escape a poverty trap, even if one 
existed. Foreign aid has increased sig-
nificantly, especially in the last decade, 
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which have used sophisticated econo-
metrics to deal with issues of adverse 
selection and reverse causality, have 
concluded that foreign aid has not 
increased economic growth rates.  The 
quarter of countries with the high-
est average aid over the last 42 years 
(which accounted for about 16 percent 
of world GDP each year) have had per 
capita income growth of only about 0.4 
percent per year.  Africa has received 
$568 billion (in today’s dollars) in aid 
over the last 42 years and zero rise in 
living standards.  
One difficulty with the plan-
ners’ approach to end world poverty 
is that it typically has poorly designed 
incentives. Many different agencies 
are involved, and they are all collec-
tively responsible for the plan to end 
world poverty. Also, they are trying to 
achieve multiple goals. Easterly pointed 
out that the United Nations millen-
nium development goals include 54 
different targets for reducing poverty 
by 2015.  This design creates free rider 
and collective action problems, where 
ultimate responsibility is not effectively 
assigned and it is difficult to hold any 
individual accountable for any one 
result.
Easterly believes a more promising 
approach is one he calls the searchers’ 
approach to foreign aid. He believes 
foreign aid could do a lot more if it 
concentrated on specific, less gran-
diose outcomes – marginal steps that 
help individuals rather than plans to 
achieve overall growth or development.   
These steps would be found by “search-
ers,” analogous to entrepreneurs in pri-
vate markets. Examples include micro-
credit programs, for which Mohammad 
Yunus, the founder of Grameen Bank, 
won the Nobel Peace Price in 2006, or 
the Progresa-Oportunidades program, 
an incentive-based health, nutrition, 
and education program for the poor 
in Mexico, designed by Santiago Levy.  
While these types of programs are 
too small to achieve overall develop-
ment, they confer real benefits to poor 
people, and in Easterly’s view, that’s all 
one should ask of foreign aid.  Also, 
advances in development economics, 
such as systematic randomized con-
trolled trials, have made the evaluation 
of which programs work and which 
don’t work more reliable, which has 
made it easier to determine where aid 
can be effective.
Easterly ended his presentation 
with two principles for solving the 
foreign aid problem. First, when some-
thing doesn’t work, discontinue it, and 
when something does work, do more of 
it. Although this principle seems obvi-
ous, Easterly says it is being violated 
repeatedly in foreign aid programs. 
Second, to induce the right incentives, 
individual aid programs should be in-
dependently evaluated, and pragmatic 
searchers who find things that work 
should be rewarded. This could go a 
long way to help ensuring that aid fi-
nally does reach the world’s poor.
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND 
GROWTH
The afternoon sessions addressed 
how financial markets, financial in-
stitutions, and other institutions can 
either help or hinder growth, poverty, 
and inequality of income.  The first of 
these two sessions examined the role 
of financial systems in economic de-
velopment.  Jeffrey Lacker, president 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Rich-
mond, discussed one aspect of finan-
cial system design, namely, the role of 
regulation in financial markets that 
are innovating and the contributions 
innovations can make to economic 
growth and well being. He focused on 
those innovations that have been par-
ticularly striking in the U.S. over the 
last few decades, in the belief that the 
U.S. experience would be relevant to 
policymakers in the developing world.  
Lacker believes that financial in-
novation has resulted in important 
economic benefits.  A major recent 
change in financial arrangements is 
the way financial markets allocate 
risks – risks are now more divisible 
and tradable. Borrowing costs have 
fallen, and consumers and businesses 
now have more opportunities in credit 
markets at better terms.  Some of the 
innovations include unsecured credit 
for households, home equity lending, 
securitization, financial derivatives, 
swaps, loan sales, and credit deriva-
tives.  The increase in household bor-
rowing and the decline in savings since 
the 1980s suggest that households have 
substituted credit for savings as their 
method for smoothing income shocks.  
The decline in borrowing costs since 
the 1980s has expanded businesses’ 
access to credit, thereby making their 
investment spending less dependent 
on internal cash flows.  Lacker posits 
that in this way, financial innovation 
could have been one of the drivers of 
the general decline in macroeconomic 
volatility since the late 1980s, the so-
called great moderation.
At the same time, concerns have 
been raised that financial innovation 
might be having an opposing effect by 
increasing financial fragility.  While 
The decline in borrowing costs since the 1980s 
has expanded businesses’ access to credit, 
thereby making their investment spending less 
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innovation has made risks more divis-
ible and therefore easier to allocate 
more broadly, it has also made it easier 
to concentrate risk.  It is now easier 
for entities to accumulate large risk 
exposures and harder for counterpar-
ties to evaluate them.  For example, 
hedge funds arbitrage away price mis-
alignments by taking large positions 
in a narrow set of claims, thereby ac-
cumulating substantial risk exposures.  
They are able to do so because they 
are relatively free from the government 
regulation facing other financial firms, 
such as commercial banks.  But if fi-
nancial innovation has increased the 
possibility of systemic risk, how should 
policymakers respond to the risks as-
sociated with the financial activities of 
less-regulated intermediaries? 
The answer depends on the ra-
tionale for government regulation of 
the financial system.  Lacker pointed 
out two general views of regulation.  
According to one view, the main mo-
tivation for regulating financial inter-
mediaries is the government safety net.  
Since the safety net has the potential 
to distort risk-taking incentives of the 
protected institutions, supervisory 
oversight is needed for institutions that 
receive safety-net support (but not for 
those that don’t).  According to the 
other view, the main motivation for 
regulating financial intermediaries is 
that there are inherent market failures 
in financial markets that lead to some 
risks, especially systemic risks, being 
mispriced.  Government supervision 
helps to ameliorate systemic risk.  Un-
der this second view, financial innova-
tion would necessitate expanding gov-
ernment regulation because innovation 
increases the potential for systemic 
risk.  Lacker is skeptical of this second 
view, since he is skeptical of the extent 
of inherent market failures in financial 
markets.  He acknowledges that mar-
kets are complex and evolving, and 
thus measuring and assessing risk are 
complex as well.  Hence, mistakes will 
happen, resulting in significant losses 
to some market participants. But he ar-
gues that these are not market failures.  
In Lacker’s view, it is important 
to remember that reducing constraints 
and allowing institutions the freedom 
to produce new products can convey 
important benefits.  He believes the 
portion of the financial sector that is 
regulated primarily via market dis-
cipline, as opposed to government 
regulation, has proved to be a useful 
testing ground for new financial prod-
ucts.  Supervisors must have a good 
understanding of emerging financial 
products and practices both in banks 
and in the unregulated financial sector 
in order to evaluate banks’ risk man-
agement practices.  When innovation 
occurs outside the government-regu-
lated financial sector, regulators’ main 
concern should be with interactions 
between the regulated and unregulated 
sectors – e.g., strengthening banks’ 
counterparty risk management prac-
tices and settlement infrastructures 
and being aware of how innovations 
may change the way exposures can 
flow back into the banking sector. 
Lacker believes that regulators should 
avoid extending constraints motivated 
by safety-net considerations to institu-
tions that do not receive safety-net 
support and should avoid extending 
the safety net to institutions now 
controlled mainly through market dis-
cipline.
Robert Townsend, of the Univer-
sity of Chicago, discussed his research 
agenda on evaluating the relationship 
between the design of financial systems 
in developing economies and economic 
development.  The work involves ap-
plied general equilibrium theory, which 
suggests that the whole may be greater 
than the sum of the parts.  It combines 
micro and macro data, and theory with 
empirics, making the approach taken 
in this research relatively rare in the 
field of development economics.  The 
research suggests that changes in fi-
nancial policy have disparate impacts 
on the various entities in the economy 
and on growth, inequality, and pover-
ty.  Townsend has used this approach 
to analyze the Thai economy, but he 
says the algorithm can and should be 
Robert Townsend, University of Chicago
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applied to other economies.6
There are many anomalies in 
the Thai economy that deviate from 
the benchmark neoclassical economy 
with perfect markets and institutions. 
For example, initial wealth facilitates 
entry into business and facilitates in-
vestment for those in business.  Many 
households appear to be constrained 
in occupation choice, which is symp-
tomatic of imperfect information, and 
poorer households and businesses are 
vulnerable to variation in income and 
cash flow, making their consumption 
and investment quite variable.  There 
appears to be less risk-sharing across 
households than would be the case in 
the benchmark economy.  This opens 
up the possibility for policy interven-
tion – but does not necessarily imply 
that it will help.  Thailand did intro-
duce several programs.
Econometric methods can be used 
to evaluate the impact of particular 
types of financial institutions and pro-
grams on households and businesses.  
For example, Thailand’s micro-credit 
program provided around $25,000 to 
about 72,000 villages in Thailand.  Be-
cause the size of the villages varies, the 
per capita treatment varied, and this 
variation can be used to help evaluate 
the impact.  Townsend and co-authors 
found that the micro-credit program 
has led to increases in the levels of 
consumption, agricultural investment, 
and total borrowing, at the same time 
both raising default rates and lowering 
savings rates; the Bank for Agriculture 
and Agricultural Cooperatives’ debt 
moratorium program, which allowed 
farmers to defer or reduce payment of 
loans in bad years, had a neutral if not 
negative impact.  
Townsend provided a summary of 
macroeconomic development in Thai-
land.  Thailand’s overall growth rate 
has been relatively high for the past 
50 years, save for the sharp downturn 
in 1997 because of the financial cri-
sis.  There has been a long-term trend 
toward industrialization, with lower 
family size and increased longevity.  
Income inequality had been increas-
ing over this period, but since 1992, 
inequality has begun to decline.  There 
are few poor people, and poverty has 
become a more transient phenomenon 
for people.  The financial system has 
deepened, and foreign capital has been 
invested in the country.
Townsend noted that in measur-
ing the economies of developing coun-
tries, including Thailand, it is impor-
tant to recognize that households are 
producers as well as consumers.  The 
typical national income accounts are 
based on corporate financial accounts 
and thus fail to recognize the impor-
tance of nonfarm proprietary income, 
which is large relative to corporate 
profits in developing 
economies.  Hence, 
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that a more de-
veloped financial 
system is correlated 
with and causally 
related to economic 
growth and reduc-
tion of poverty, 
but it has mixed 
consequences for 
the distribution of 
income.  Increased 
access and use of the formal financial 
system by the population enhances 
the growth of total factor productiv-
ity.  According to Townsend’s work, 
financial liberalization that facilitates 
access to intermediaries and weakens 
wealth constraints especially benefits 
the talented poor in the population.  
Increasing collateral and offering more 
generous credit limits appear to be 
more effective than interest rate subsi-
dies.  However, existing firms that use 
unskilled labor would tend to lose from 
financial liberalization.  Townsend’s 
research also indicates that the growth 
gains derive mainly from liberaliza-
tion of the domestic financial system; 
increased availability of capital via 
foreign investment appears to have had 
small effects.  The basic conclusion of 
the research is that financial systems 
and their evolution do matter not only 
for growth rates and poverty but also 
for the distribution of income, business 
formation, and investment.
Dani Rodrik, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
6For more information on Townsend’s Thailand 
project, see the many publications, databases, 
and models available on his website at www.spc.
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INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND 
DEVELOPMENT
Our final session expanded 
further on the role of institutions in 
fostering economic growth. Dani 
Rodrik, of the Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, 
began his discussion by pointing out 
some of the ideas most economists 
agree on, some of which were cited in 
the earlier sessions.  Most economists 
recognize the importance of economic 
growth in reducing poverty in the 
developing world, of domestic policy 
choices in determining economic 
outcomes in poor nations, and of 
market-friendly, fiscally responsible 
policies in generating economic 
growth.  The challenge has been to 
translate these principles into effective 
policies.7 Indeed, in Rodrik’s view, 
the paradox is that the past quarter 
of a century has seen an increase in 
economic growth and a reduction in 
poverty in much of the world, while 
the standard policy agenda has been 
a failure. Countries that adopted the 
standard reforms have done poorly 
relative to other 
countries and 
also relative to 
their own past 
performance.  This 
echoed a point 
made by Zagha 
in the morning 
session.  
In Rodrik’s 
view the lesson is 
that the general 
principles of good 
policy do not 
map into specific 
policies.  To devise 
effective policies, 
policymakers must 
do a lot of context-
specific analysis, 
and in many cases, this will result in 
policies that appear to be somewhat 
unusual or heterodox but that are in 
the service of orthodox policy goals.  
It is easier to specify the functions 
that good institutional arrangements 
perform than to specify the form they 
must take.  For example, successful 
countries have, among other things, 
provided effective protection of prop-
erty rights and contract enforcement, 
maintained macroeconomic stability, 
sought to integrate into the world 
economy via trade and investment, 
and provided effective prudential 
regulation of financial intermediaries. 
However, these do not translate direct-
ly into a unique set of policies.  Indeed, 
as Rodrik discussed, China was able 
to become one of the fastest growing 
economies by following a strategy that 
targeted one binding constraint at a 
time – agriculture, then industry, then 
foreign trade, now finance – rather 
than trying to reform all sectors at the 
same time.
Rodrik said he was not advocat-
ing that other countries adopt the 
reforms China enacted but rather the 
approach.  He ended his presentation 
with some general lessons to be taken 
from the policy experience over the 
past quarter of a century.  First, bind-
ing constraints differ across countries 
and across time, and there is ample 
evidence that different approaches can 
lead to higher growth.  For example, 
in some countries, the financial system 
is the binding constraint – there are 
many potentially high-return projects 
but not enough credit to finance them.  
In other countries, there is enough 
credit, but there are not enough 
high-return projects.  These groups of 
countries would necessitate different 
types of reforms.  Reforms have to be 
well-targeted to work within the politi-
cal and other constraints in a country.  
This was a point also endorsed by 
Zagha in the morning session.  Finally, 
the process must be ongoing.  Institu-
tions must be continually strength-
ened, and binding constraints that 
arise later must be addressed.  A once-
and-for-all reform may ignite growth 
but is unlikely to sustain it.
Ross Levine, of Brown University, 
elaborated on the role of the financial 
system in reducing poverty.  In his 
view, much of the world has financial 
system policies that limit the poor’s 
access to the financial system, and this 
harms the financial system’s ability to 
improve the welfare of the poor.  A 
large body of research suggests that 
a well-functioning financial system 
— one that seeks out entrepreneurs 
and projects, finances those with the 
highest expected returns, and monitors 
those investments — helps improve 
economic growth by improving capital 
Ross Levine, Brown University
7See Dani Rodrik, “Goodbye Washington Con-
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of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 
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allocation.8 Note that this type of 
financial system does not advocate 
equality of outcomes, but it does tend 
to equalize opportunities.  But does a 
well-functioning financial system help 
the poor?  Does it help the poor dis-
proportionately compared to the rich 
in society?  The research suggests the 
answer is yes.  Across many countries 
and over a long period 
(1960-2001), there is a 
strong positive relationship 
between the level of private 
credit as a share of GDP (a 
measure of financial devel-
opment) and the growth of 
income of the poorest 20 
percent of the population, 
controlling for average 
economic growth in the 
country and other country 
traits.9 The research also 
suggests that financial 
development is associated 
with lower income inequal-
ity. Even in the United 
States, evidence shows that 
improved efficiency of the 
banking systems within 
individual states was as-
sociated with faster state 
economic growth, and 
deregulation of branching 
restrictions across states 
had a positive impact on growth; and 
while it did not reverse the trend to-
ward greater inequality, it reduced the 
level of inequality.
Financial development stands out 
in this respect.  Other government 
policies have been shown to have less 
or even a negative impact on growth 
and poverty.  For example, govern-
ment-owned banks and government 
loan programs for small and medium 
enterprises haven’t been shown to 
reduce poverty or income inequality.  
Levine concluded by suggesting that 
given the bulk of the evidence, it was 
time for the international policy arena 
to rethink the potentially large role 
finance can play in the fight against 
poverty.
Ann Harrison, of the University 
of California at Berkeley, our final 
speaker, addressed the important issue 
of the relationship between globaliza-
tion and poverty.  Almost all measures 
of globalization have increased over 
the past 40 years: Tariffs have fallen, 
and capital flows, foreign investment, 
and trade flows across countries have 
increased.  At the same time, while 
the number of people worldwide living 
in poverty is still quite high, the num-
ber has fallen.  In 1980, 40 percent of 
people were living on less than $1 per 
day; by 2000, this number had fallen to 
20 percent.  This raises two questions: 
Can globalization be used as a strategy 
to reduce poverty, and – an increas-
ingly important issue – how has glo-
balization contributed 
to income inequality?  
Researchers addressed 
these questions in a 
study directed by Har-
rison.10 The results 
of the study question 
the existing orthodox 
trade perspective.  The 
researchers’ findings 
include: (1) greater 
openness to trade is 
associated with higher
inequality in poor 
countries; (2) financial 
integration is associated 
with higher consump-
tion volatility in the less 
financially developed, 
very poor countries; (3) 
agricultural support in 
rich countries helps in 
poor countries because 
most poor countries are 
net food importers and 
so benefit from being able to import 
food at a lower price; and (4) there 
does not appear to be a robust direct 
relationship between openness and 
reduction of poverty.  None of these is 
the expected result.  For example, from 
an orthodox trade perspective, greater 
openness to trade might be expected 
to raise the income of countries with 
a comparative advantage at producing 
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goods with unskilled workers, but the 
opposite appears to be true.  Simi-
larly, one might expect that financial 
integration might enable countries to 
smooth consumption more, not less.  
Harrison posits that one reason there 
doesn’t seem to be a robust relation-
ship between globalization and reduc-
tion in poverty in the aggregate data 
is that while opening up trade results 
in higher growth, it also leads to more 
inequality.  Another possibility is that 
the aggregate data are just too noisy to 
uncover the relationship if it exists.
Thus, Harrison turns to country 
case studies to address the question.  
She emphasized the importance of 
looking at household data, since there 
is a large amount of heterogeneity 
among the poor in response to global-
ization.  The importance of heteroge-
neity was discussed by both Helpman 
and Townsend earlier during the Policy 
Forum.  The research results suggest 
that the poor in expanding sectors 
do gain when globalization increases; 
however, the poor in previously pro-
tected sectors lose.  The standard 
trade models would suggest that open-
ing up to trade countries that have a 
comparative advantage in producing 
goods with poor, unskilled workers 
would benefit the workers in those 
countries, since they would be able 
to export more goods.  However, the 
standard model assumes that workers 
can instantaneously relocate to export-
oriented sectors, and the individual 
country data suggest that workers can-
not easily relocate to the expanding 
sectors.  Also, poorer countries tend 
to have more protectionism on sectors 
that use unskilled workers, and the 
exporting firms tend to use skilled la-
bor even in countries that have a lot of 
unskilled labor.  Thus, the traditional 
models do not capture the situation 
in poor nations.  These results suggest 
that bundling trade reforms with other 
complementary policies is needed in 
order to make globalization effective 
at reducing poverty.  For example, 
improving the infrastructure, technol-
ogy, and credit markets that inhibit 
moving the production of unskilled 
workers to world markets would be a 
complementary policy to help reduce 
poverty as trade is opened. Carefully 
targeted income support to those work-
ers adversely affected by trade reform is 
another example of a complementary 
policy that can help ensure that glo-
balization leads to reduced poverty and 
benefits for all.
SUMMARY
The 2006 Policy Forum generated 
lively discussion among the program 
speakers and audience on the chal-
lenges facing the world in reducing 
poverty. Recent research has helped 
identify policies that are potentially 
more effective and others that are less 
effective.  The research suggests that 
most policies create both winners and 
losers, and to be effective at reducing 
poverty, policies must recognize this 
fact.  Forum participants discussed the 
importance of economic growth, in-
stitutions, globalization, and financial 
market development in reducing pov-
erty and income inequality.  In many 
cases, the results of the research ques-
tion the orthodox view.  This under-
scores the value of continued rigorous 
economic modeling and empirical re-
search in developing policies to further 
reduce the still large number of people 
who are living in poverty worldwide. B R